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MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS AS AFFECTING TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY.
BEING REMARKS OZ AN ESSAY IN THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER FOR
NOVEMBER

1863.1

The paper referred to having appeared in the November number of the American Law Register, and again later, augmented by
I The differences of opinion between lawyers and medical men on the subject of
mental unsoundness have recently been much discussed, particularily in England,
where the attention, not only of the two professions, but of parliament, has been
called to the whole subject, and especially to insaiiity as involving irresponsibility
for crime, by the remarkable case of George Victor Townley, convicted of murder,
and afterwards declared insane, respited and transferred to a lunatic asylum.
Having given the legal view of the question as affecting testamentary capacity in
our November number, we now present a medical discussion of it from the pen of
Dr. J. Parigot, of New York, a gentlemen who has given special study to this
branch of his profession. We do not, however, desire to be understood as adopting fully the views ofeither article. The method of study and the object in view
of the two professions are essentially different: the lawyer deals with the question
as one involving the general good of society, but the physician's object is
chiefly the good of his patients. We do not, therefore, think the views of the two
professions can be entirely harmonized; and though the law, to a certain extent,
follows the footsteps of the sciences, yet, as lawyers, we should undoubtedly regret
to see the law on this subject too much under the influence of purely medical
views.-ED. A. L. R.
VOL. XI.-25
(885)

MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS

a discussion on Moral Insanity, in the January number of the
American Journalof Insanity, has brought prominently this very
important subject before both professions, legal and medical. For
our part, we applaud all efforts tending to settle medico-legal difficulties ; and, therefore, acknowledging the merit of the writer, we
intend only to present a few remarks on the medical and philosophical side of the questions treated in the essay. We must, however, insist on principles which, in our opinion, ought to have
formed the proper ground for their investigation, and which have
such great bearing on the daily practical occurrences before the
,courts of this country.
All those who have had special cases to try involving either legal
tnsanity or its effects on the capacity of executing a will, have
foand it of the most absolute necessity to agree on the definition
of terms ; now, practically, it is very important that definitions
should always keep as near as possible to the nature of what they
are intended to represent. In general, objects considered from
various points, either scientific, legal, or social, may be subject to
some variation in their definition; but if we analyze them, they
must be brought to one type, their nature. Thus it appears that
Aegal or medical definitions, when properly made, ought never to
lead to different notions; and still we find that unhappily such is
the case in medico-legal jurisprudence. There is another necessity
inherent to our imperfect reason and nature. Those definitions
must change according to the state of knowledge. There -is no
doubt that truth, in its concrete sense, depends on the advancement of science, so that its legal or medical applications must follow the wake of civilization; hence all the difficulties about the
psychological terminology employed in the laws of all nations; all
these terms are one or two centuries behind the real status of
science. A legal definition is often a scientific absurdity. We
nave another difficulty to point out: Great care must be taken to
understand the real sense in which terms are commonly used in
each profession. A discussion between physicians might sometimes
mislead a jurist in reference to the acceptation of certain terms.
The Essayist, in his analysis of some opinions given on the nature
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,f moral insanity in the association of the superintendents of our
asylums, might have remarked that those gentlemen who admitted
the existence of moral insanity, and those who denied such fact, had
not previously stated what each understood by the term given to
that disease. The first argued the possibility of one of the mental
faculties being altered, and thus constituting insanity. They contended also, that there is no reason why the brain may not
be disordered in such way as to derange only the manifestations of the affective faculties (and that of volition), as in other
cases, to derange only.the intellectual faculty. The second (the
disbelievers) replied that nothing could rightly be called moral
insanity except an impulse to do wrong, so uncontrollable by the
processes of reason-themselves being unimpaired-as to amount to
a disease. So far, we see that both parties might have agreed
very well, since the apparent difference consists, on one side, in
the affirmation of a fact which, on the other side, is only considered
as an exception. Now that fact analyzed shows humane volition
perverted and destroyed by a material disease of our tissues. But
the recorded discussion of May 1863 was but incidental; few of
us were prepared for it, and this subject may be reconsidered.
Should it come again before the Association, it is possible three
preliminary questions might be first discussed.
1st. Is moral insanity to be understood as an essential disease
of our moral nature only, which does not affect or proceed from
the body, and which consequently cannot have physical symptoms ?
2d. Can a moral or volitional perversion be the result of a disease of the brain, which may be sometimes affected for a short
time only, and, in other cases, permanently?
3d. If so, what sort of symptoms must be discoverable in each
of these different cases ?
As far as we are concerned, we believe that moral insanity cannot be considered as a purely psychical disease, as the ancients
said-a mere form without matter, but as a disease of the brain,
idiopathic or sympathic, which, besides the accompanying bodily
symptoms, affects one only of our faculties. It is often the incipi
ent form of insanity and the forerunner of mania and dementia.
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The believers in moral insanity do not pretend to find in the brain
the organ of volition, neither do they say that the will can go mad
-such terms would be their condemnation. What then would an
involuntary volition signify ? an absurdity; but what constitutes
the real lesion of volition is the loss of conscience, the absence of
the ego ; for, if the insane does not know what his will or his
instinct impels or forces him to do, where is his liberty ?
The morbid perversion of the will is not to be contested. Homicidal and suicidal cases, dipsomania, kleptomania, pyromania, are
the proofs of its unhappy existence. But ,in all such well-proved
cases of insanity, physical symptoms must be found; they canno;
be simulated, and are the surest ground for medical experts.
A curious illustration of the necessity of the analysis of terms
is the quotation made by the Essayist about general moral mania,
which fits also moral insanity, "a disorder of the moral affections
and propensities without any symptom of delusion or error impressed upon the understanding;" still, such definition applied
either to monomani& or moral insanity is, medically, incorrect.
Mr. Wetmore says that the Association of Physicians admitted
that "manifestations of the emotional faculties which are the concomitants of insanity, and which, from their peculiar, extravagant,
or unnatural character, can only be attributed to disease," we
wonder he Adid not then conclude that there is no mental disease
without both mental and corporeal symptoms. It is true. that
generally we, psychopathists, take more notice of psychological
symptoms, especially those that are so preponderant, that they
seem to govern the whole mental condition of patients; but we are
certain it is a gross mistake; insanity is only intelligible as relation of two realities, although of different nature. Having
ascertained the condition of the immaterial part of the mind, we
ought to describe and be able to certify the full value of the concomitant signs belonging to the material part of its organism.
The mind, for us, is but the manifestation of the soul by the body.
It is perhaps owing to such neglect that. two learned and highly
esteemed physicians of Spain, Drs. Pi y Molist and Pujadas, are
now suffering in prison for having made affidavits, which the in-
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competent Academy of Yalentia has considered as being false and
perjured.
Another important point remains in regard to moral insanity.
We do not believe that the noticeable point in moral insanity is the
character of the act that indicates the existence of insanity, but
rather the condition of the perpetrator. Acts are of a secondary
value for such purpose, unless the only criterion left to judge of
the state of mind of a departed person at the moment of the commission of the act. There is no doubt that acts are in close connection with the state of conscience of their perpetrators; in
criminal cases their conception and execution are examined attentively to arrive at the sanity or insanity of the accused party ;
but, by themselves alone, they could not convince any one of being
insane, Insane acts are only committed by recognised insane
persons ; and here again comes the necessity of finding the symptoms of disease. -The very example brought forward by the Essayist shows the truth of our proposition. A similar case to- his happened some years ago in Belgium. A man was sent to the Ghael
Asylum because, under suspicion of insanity, he had publiely
divested himself of his clothing to the skin. At Gheel, it was
found he suffiered from no delusion ; no physical symptom could be
detected, and the man confessed afterwards that he Wanted only to
be sent during winter- to a comfortable home. A maniac might
have done the same act under the influence of some delusion. In
this case it was not an insane act, but a scandalous one. Our Essayist is, perhaps, of the same opinion about the insufficiency of acts
alone to, establish insanity, for he- concludes thus : -If it is impossible to pronounce any case to be one of insanity, until the
existence of mental alienation is actually.proved, then it is possible
that an insane man (I suppose one seemingly so) should be held
responsible for his acts. The axiom .onsilium, non factum,
puniendurn est, remains here applicable.
Moral obliquity is also never alone a sign or a symptom of
,insanity. Although the former qualities or defects follow men
when they become lunatics, still every psychopathist is enabled to
see cases of virtuous men and women showing immoral propensities,
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and using sometimes words they never had pronounced before
their disease. We think the following inference cannot be ad
mitted : that because moral obliquity might be a psychical symptom
it should constitute a part of a whole entity; such principle of
detecting insanity cannot be adopted, nor can it be deduced by
analogy as in the method employed by Cuvier, Buckland, or Agassiz,
and others, who, with diminutive and partial remnants of unknown
animals, have proceeded to their complete recomposition ; and the
reason is, that the conditions of existence of animals are constituted by necessary relations ofform8, whereas the perversion of our
moral nature is not necessarily a condition of insanity; it may
have acted as a cause of it, but physical morbid action may and
has often been the primitive cause of the disease.
For the present let. us say that the term moral insanity is in
opposition with the real nature of the disease, and a riddle conveying false notions to jurist and physician.
Insanity, which in mental pathology is subdivided in relation to
numerous organic and functional lesions connected with mental
symptoms, is.divested of its most easily discoverable symptolas
in its legal diagnosis. In criminal courts it isleft to the appreIciation of the jurymen after they have heard the evidence of experts
and the charge of the judge. In civil actions the law recognises
only active and passive insanity, and the several forms therein contained. In the first division' are comprised what Dr. Ray has
designated as the lesions of the faculties shbsequent to their
development, and in the second the defective development of the
fabulties. This is evidently an artificial method which excludes too
much the pathology of insanity; and its use, as long as a medicopsychical one be excluded, will oblige lawyers and experts to force
great varieties of mental affections together under one or the other
of these denominations. It is true that legal definitions and their
appointed terms are often so vague that lawyers are able, with
some circumlocution of speech, to argue cases according to the
real principles of psychiatry. And it is advantageous it should be
so, until a convenient legal terminology be adopted. It is certain
-that between wrong or undefined appellations, fixed some centuries
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ago by Norman or English statutes, and a clear and satisfactory
exposition of facts, the choice of our courts in following the latter
would be justified.
Persons of unsound mind cannot make a valid will; this is
a general rule of jurisprudence adopted in all countries; but
the term of unsoundness of mind has not appeared sufficiently
explicit. Where is the standard *of soundness of mind and. its
limits? Individuals show considerable difference in what might
be called the ,-mean expression!' of reason, and the energy of the
faculties. The exact line of division between soundness and unsoundness in a healthy condition is equally difficult to trace. In
sane persons we must consider circumstances which often have
gr at influence on apparent, soundness of mind ; thus moral affectioi, corporeal diseases, age, &c., might change the value of a
common measure of mental strength. General opinion has, however, admitted that unsoundness of mind is synonymous with
insanity. In that. case, the only difficulty is to make evident the
difference between, the first or least degree of idiocy, called imbecility, and a physiological, but rather inferior mental capacity-silliness. Wa are the more inclined ta consider those terms as
convertible, because common law courts have ruled "cthat it was not
sufficient that the testator be of memory when he makes his will to
answer familiar and usual questions, but he ought to have a disposing memory- so that he is able to make a dispositioti of his lands
with understanding and reason, and that is such a memory which
the law calls sane and perfect memory." Such is the English doctrine from the Statute of Wills to the present time, and we must
confess it appears to us not a clear one. Probably its object was,
first, to make a distinction between the sanity or insanity of the
testator ; therefore, considering a part as equivalent to the whole,
memory expresses here the power of reflection, permitting the
judgment necessary to answer familiar and usual questions; consequently such persons are not to be held insane; secondly, as
to a disposing memory, it means probably the necessary quantity
of reason in order to make a proper and spontaneous disposition
of property; this might exist with a weak memory, but one
consistent with a sane mind If it is permitted to consider
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fnsoundness of mind as being the equivalent of insanity, 6
vast number of mental diseases are subject to real testamentary
incapacity; therefore, very little is to be said about them in this
review. All mental diseases offering no lucid intervals belong to
this division. But the difficult cases of medical jirisprudence
are not found amongst them. Before examining the last, Tet-us
remark that, amongst the first division, mania embraces the innumerable cases of permanent delusions affecting either the ese,
the feelings, the intellect, and even volition. (This latter faculty
with a restriction we will explain further.) All these delusions
iay have an exalted, depressed, melancholy, or perverted type, and
again these various forms may be connected with of complicated by
general paralysis and Various netiroses of both muscular systems.
Amongst the- second d ivision which embraces a defective development of mind or its arrests, imbecility, if not considered as a total
deprivation 6f understanding, will be placed on the debateable
ground Qf testamentary capacity. Idiocy, in its lower degrees, and
dementia, do not permit the execution of wills. According -to
the Essayist,. delusion and insanity are considered almost as convertible terms. This is partly ° true, but we inust state in *ibat
cases -it is not. In the general acceptation of the Latin word.
deludere signifies- to deceive, to delude. A delusion may -be considered as a deception, a mistake, an error. In fact, the thinking
ego is deceived, but still knows what he is about, and corrects the
error by aii ulterior observation or reflection. But such is not the
case with an insane or morbid delusion. It is true, nobody kno*a
the first word about the relation of the physical and vital laws to
our moral nature, but physicians are able to'distinguish the only
characters of morbid delusions which must exist both in a mental
and corporeal disease. Error, sin, delusions, although of a nioral
nature, may also become active agents in altering the structure of
the body; for instance, the exaggeration of the principle of our
personality, egotism and pridd may bring on a disease and its
delusions. A rich man may fancy himself at first of a very
superior ability, and of a high position in society; some time after
this delusion may lead him to believe he is a prine, and this mor.
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bid delusion will be accompanied by the whole cortege of physical
symptoms. An error may also proceed from our organs, the
senses: then the receptivity is impaired, and illusion is the consequence of it. But if there is no mental disease, such illusion
being subjected to examination is soon corrected. It will not be
the same if' insanity exists; then such illusion could not be observed or reflected- upon, and would'become a morbid one. Whilst
engaged in the definition of these important signs of insanity, let
us add that a hallucinationis but a subjective illusion which may
still be rejected by reason. The cases of Socrates, Pascal, and,
what is most curious, of whole communities under a special hallucination, are illustrations of such a fact. But such illusion, taking
its origin in the mind itself, puts the sufferer in a greater peril.
There are also voluntary delusions which mystics procure systematically by a continued attention and intuition directed to
certain subjects. It leads nervous individuals to ecstasy, during
which, the self-control being lost, all the mental faculties are
absorbed in the contemplation of some delusion.
Delirium is not to be confounded with a delusion. According to
the signification of the word, it is a wandering of the mind, which.
by itself, does not constitute insanity as appearing also in other,
but not mental diseases.
To resume, delusion is not a convertible term with insanity.
A morbid delusion is insanity, though not exclusively its sign.
A man is not only insane because he reasons from subjective
delusions or hallucinations to their objective reality, but because
in other cases (moral insanity, diastrephia, &c.), he has no power
to control his will, nor choice between right and wrong.
In order to have a clear idea of the following legal definition, it
must also be analyzed. " General moral mania, as understood in law,
consists in a disorder of the moral affections and propensities, with.
out any symptom of delusion or error impressed upon the understanding." The nature of the disorder meant here must be a perversion
of the affections and volition. If it was a mere exaggeration or
depression of feelings, mania or hypomania would soon bring on
morbid delusions. Everybody knows that a moral perversion may
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coexist with sanity as long as human conicience knows and chooses
immorality as a principle and a motive of actions; but a moral perversion may gradually afflict the body, and then is only called morbid
when in relation with malady; in fact, the sufferer has no more rhe
power of intuition necessary to conduct himself. The case of
Dew vs. Olark, 8 Add. 79, is illustrative of the first part of this
proposition, that the testator was not an insane but a wicked
man. General moral mania, in its legal definition, is nothing but
moral insanity; supposing the only criterion of insanity to be
delusion, moral mania, according to its legal definition, must have
for its sign the perversion of volition and instincts-even in such
disease the test of discerning right from wrong is insufficient.
What then ? We could not say the delusion of will, the error of
the propensities; these expressions do not represent any morbid
relation to acts or appetites, as they may in relation to the intelligence. In a memoir read before the Academy of Medicine of
New York, we proposed to designate the guile or error of insane
persons in their perverted acts by the special name of Diastrephia,
in order to avoid all the moral insanity, moral mania, manie
raisonnante,folie sans ddlire, &c.
It is curious that general moral mania has not brought on the
incapacity of making testamentary dispositions. Morbid perversions of the will are certainly more injurious to society and to
families than mere delusions; and, being equally a good test of
insanity, they ought to be considered as a legal criterion also.
The testamentary capacity of monomaniacs and monodiastrephics
(if such simple term could be acceptable, instead of partial morally
insane persons) has been contested or admitted in several countries: contested especially if the will is the consequence of fixed
ideas or delusions, admitted when the act has been made during
lucid intervals, or on consideration that the disease is not in an
advanced state, or its lesions on the nervous system not important
The French Code Civil, § 901, says: -To execute a will, the
testator must be of sound mind." See. 489: -,Any person of
age, being in an habitual state of imbecility, dementia, or furor,
must be interdicted, even when that state presents lucid intervals."
Interdiction decides the incapacity of making contracts or wills.
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The Prussian Algemein Landrecht or Common Law says, § 20,
title 12: cc Those who are deprived only from time to time of their
reason, are able to dispose of their property by testament during
a lucid interval."
Here we have two opposite principles of law on the same point:
the first aims at an absolute right, the second is less theoretical, and
considers a relative state of Aaif reason as possible. This is not to
be wondered at. In France, in civil lawsuits, not always relative to
insanity, three cases are admitted-soundness, unsoundness, and
half unsoundness of mind; whereas in criminal jurisprudence, the
question is, insane or not insane. In Prussia, half insanity is
legally admitted in monomania and lucid intervals, but there is no
such thing in criminal cases. Again, in the kingdom of Hanover,
in criminal cases, lucid intervals are considered as extenuating
circumstances, and in England lucid intervals are fatal to insane
culprits, as the horrible case of Buranelli has shown lately. We
may say, therefore, that in an abstract point of view, justice is but
an idea, not a fact; and that such an ideal, like every pure conception, loses much of its value in its material applications. Now,
as testators in general, and in particular (a fortiori) those who are
insane by intervals, have little chance to realize justice in their
wills, the courts and juries try to supply their deficiencies, according to the moral value and social fitness of such documents.
We must confess that, reading the case of Dew vs. Clark, our
impression was that the insanity of Ely Stott was not scientifically
proved. Here is a short analysis of the case: One Ely Stott, an
immoral quack, who committed crimes against God and man, had
taken an unnatural dislike to his own child, a daughter, and
treated her from infancy to womanhood with the utmost barbarity.
Dying, he deprived her by testament of the fortune he had acquired. The related proofs of insanity in Dr. Beck's Medical
Jurisprudence, are the following: ",
The deceased's state of mind
was clearly and essentially different from that of a merely wicked
man, or of one under the influence of a prejudice, however strong.
Other circumstances indicative of insanity on several subjects were
proved, such as his conduct to his first wife, his blasphemies while

MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS

reading the Bible, and his extraordinary prayers. He was a medical
electrician, and conceived himself endowed with supernatural
powers in the use of his apparatu8(1820). He had also imbibed
an idea of the feasability of delivering pregnant females by means
of this agent," &c. Such as the case is reported, we believe, that
now-a-days, medico-legal experts would with difficulty find real
signs of insanity in all these assertions. The greatest authorities
in psychiatry, and amongst them Esquirol, Lelut, Forbes-Winslow, Bucknill, Hood, &c., have insisted on the difficulty of, distinguishing insanity from depravity hy mere moral symptoms. Where
is the morbid delusion of Stott? If a grand jury had indicted
such felon on the public report of his cruelties and crimes, perhaps
physicians might have found that a morbid perversion existed, and
would have detailed in their affidavits its accompanying symptoms.
Sir JOHi NIcOLL calls the unnatural hatred of a father a delusion,
and considers it a partial insanity. He declares that notwithbtanding his general sanity, the deceased was insane as to her,
and that it was a mental perversion caused by antipathy. Also
that the will was the offspring of his delusion. Nothing like that
exists in science; but there are cases in which moral principles,
although clear, are not easy to apply. We presume the court
and jury were under the impression that such miseries as this poor
girl had suffered were, if possible, augmenting her natural right to
the fortune of her father. What we do not understand is, that
such a case and its false doctrine could have an influence in this
country. The case of G-renwood vs. Grenwood, 8 Curteis,
App., deserves also an analysis from the importance of the.
doctrine promulgated by the celebrated Lord KENYON. We must
remark, however, that we find no analogy with the preceding
one. An English gentleman, Mr. Grenwood, at the death of his
father, and under the influence of a bad constitution and grief,
became insane. A keeper from an adjoining asylum was called
in. At that period (1786) a brutal treatment was considered the
best practical means to cure insanity. .Restraint was applied
tprobably without sufficient cause), and the patient grew to such
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degree of irritation that he conceived a profound hatred against
his brother, whom he supposed the cause of his sufferings. However, the disease was of short duration-he recovered. Mr. Grenwood became afterwards consumptive, and was advised to repair to
Portugal, where he finally died. However, before his departure
he made his will, by which he disinherited his brother in favor of
a near relative. The judge (Lord KENYON) charging the jury
said: " The inquiry, and the sole inquiry in this case is, whether
he was of sound and disposing mind and memory at the time when
he made his will. However deranged before, if he had recovered
his reason at the time, he was competent to make his will. You
are to consider whether his mind was entire to make the disposition-not whether the disposition was whimsical, cruel, but to see
whether it was the disposition of this man's mind..... If you
think that whenever that, topic (his ill treatment) occurred to him,
it totally deranged his mind, and prevented him from judging of
whom the objects of his bounty should be according to his own
will, then the will cannot stand. But if you think he *was of
competent mind to make his will, to exercise his judgment, however disturbed by passions which ought not to be encouraged, then
the will ought to stand." The verdict was in favor of the will,.
but, by the most curious want of organization of justice in England,
an opposite verdict was obtained in the Common Pleas !
There is no doubt, in this case, that the testator had been of
insane mind, and had been cured since. Like many personEi who
have been in the same predicament, an error about the cruelty of
parents or friends remained in his mind. Was this error a morbid
delusion.? Certainly not. No symptoms accompanied this error.
The testator was wrong about facts which might be doubtful; there.
was no objective evidence that could have contradicted his supposition, in such way, that to oppose it would have shown an unsound mind. Now, we believe and hope that, in time, all such nice
distinctions might be avoided, if, in all cases, perceptible signs of
insanity are required, or at least those which are found in docunents of departed persons.
Before concluding this first paper on the important subject of
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testamentary capacity, a very interesting case remains to be ex
amined, that of Waringvs. Waring, 6 Moore's Privy Council Cases
809. According to facts as they are related in Wharton and
Stilld, the testator was a sort of maniac with some lucid int ervals,
but she was subject to hallucinations and illusions. The Privy
Council of England, before whom the will was brought for decision,
gave a unanimous opinion on the case, and Lord BouRGHAR
delivered it as based on the following principles: The mind is one
and indivisible, and if unsound, at all times, on one subject, it ii
a diseased mind; therefore, partial insanity deprives persons of
testamentary capacity.

Theoretically, it is true, the mind is an unity-but if the spirit.
is the same, are the gifts not different? If there is anything
material in the organ of the thought, sensitiveness, feelings, will,
and faculties may have different degrees of strength, and not be
bound to each other in any respect, as we often observe. Let it
be well understood, this opinion has nothing common with phrenology ad vulgarly understood. Now all diseased minds are not
equally injured. We have already attempted to say why, in
practice, juries and judges may consistently admit the validity of
wills made under peculiar circumstances. At all events, it would
be unwise to subordinate courts to mere psychical or medical suppositions. In this respect we might say to experts : In dubiis nihil
moveto.

The Essayist takes his ground for reproving the judgment of the
Privy Council in the well-known lectures of Sir WILLTAM HAMm.
TON on metaphysics. He thinks it is ') mere assumption to say
the seat of mentar disorder is the mind , but we believe this opinion
contrary to facts, especially accordifig to our definition of the
mind. Medical observation shows that psychological symptoms
are coincident with pathological conditions of the brain ; besides,
the transmissibility of such conditions, in hereditary cases, proves
also the same point beyond any possible dispute. It is well
established and admitted that science will never discover the exact
correspondence of material lesion with its direct psychical manifestation or vice-versa, but neither law or medicine wants so much.

